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ABSTRACT 
The number of displaced persons in the world is at an 
unprecedented high. There are more than seventy million people in the 
world that are currently searching for a place to live. To put this into 
context, if these people were all in the one country it would be the 
nineteenth biggest country in the world. There is no tenable solution to 
the crisis. A large portion of these displaced people are refugees. The 
legal definition of a refugee is relatively narrow. This presents an 
obstacle to many people who are in need of protection from being 
relocated to any of the countries that are signatories to the Refugee 
Convention. The United States is in fact one of the more than 140 
countries that have signed this convention and it receives more refugee 
applications than any other nation on earth. The key limiting aspect of 
the Convention is that for a person to qualify for protection, they must 
be in fear of persecution for one of five very specific reasons. These 
reasons are race, ethnicity, particular social group, religion and 
political opinion. If these grounds are interpreted narrowly it 
necessarily means that countries, even those that are signatories to the 
Convention, can legitimately refuse to provide asylum to people in need 
of protection. Thus, the manner in which the grounds are interpreted 
has a profound impact on the ability of displaced people to emigrate to 
other nations. In this Article, the Author examines the meaning of one 
of these refugee grounds, namely political opinion. The ground has 
been interpreted unduly narrowly. The Author examines the history of 
the Refugee Convention and the most persuasive jurisprudential 
meaning of political opinion and conclude that a broader sphere of 
operation should be accorded to this concept. This will provide the 
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pathway for a much greater number of asylum seekers being granted 
protection in countries such as the United States. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The number of displaced people in the world currently is at a 
record high. Many parts of the world are experiencing an 
unprecedented and growing crisis regarding the amount of people that 
have been forcibly displaced from their homeland. There is no coherent 
or tenable solution to the problem. 
In April 2019, the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, Filippo Grandi, addressed the current unabating 
displacement crisis in a brief to the United Nations Security Council. 
During the briefing, the High Commissioner expressed his concern at 
the unprecedented toxic stigmatization that is being directed to 
refugees and acknowledged that current responses to the refugee crisis 
are becoming increasingly inadequate. However, according to the High 
Commissioner, it is “wrong” to view the crisis as one which is 
unmanageable because it can be addressed with the right political will 
and improved responses.1 He went on to highlight that the main driver 
of refugee displacement is conflict, and so “if conflicts were prevented 
or resolved, most refugee flows would disappear,” appealing to 
members of the Security Council to help address the root causes of 
conflicts and not its symptoms.2 
Preventing or resolving international conflicts is an ideal 
aspiration, however, it is not pragmatically tenable given the extent of 
geo-political fractures in the world. Accordingly, less ambitious 
solutions are necessary to ameliorate the problem of displaced people. 
This Article is about providing one such solution. 
The means by which more displaced people have been 
accommodated in other countries is the Refugee Convention. This 
instrument commenced in 1951, and currently there are 145 countries 
that are signatories to it.3 It does not present as being a total solution to 
the displaced person crisis, however, given the overwhelming nature of 
 
1. UN’s Grandi Slams ‘Toxic Language of Politics’ Aimed at Refugees, Migrants, UN 
NEWS (Apr. 9, 2019), https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/04/1036391 [https://perma.cc/H664-
UVLB]. 
2. U.N. SCOR, 74th Sess., 8504th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.8504 (Apr. 9, 2019), available 
at https://www.unhcr.org/en-au/admin/hcspeeches/5cf4d2b37/briefing-united-nations-security-
council.html [https://perma.cc/XNM3-U2C3]. 
3. States Parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 
Protocol U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES [hereinafter UNHCR] 1, 
https://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b73b0d63.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YQ5-RAJ7]. 
Note that there are 146 state parties to the 1967 protocol. See id. 
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the crisis and the lack of other plausible solutions, the operation and 
scope of the Convention is now more important than ever in providing 
a pathway for people to settle in other countries. This is especially true 
in relation to the United States given that it receives more refugee 
claims than any other country, approximately 250,000 per year in 
recent years.4 Additionally, there are over 900,000 people in the United 
States who are awaiting the processing of their claims.5 
In this Article, the Author considers one of the most important 
parts of the Convention. In order for a person to qualify for refugee 
status, it is essential that they are at risk of persecution for one of five 
distinct reasons being race, ethnicity, particular social group, religion, 
and political opinion. The focus of this Article is on one of the key, and 
most contentious and uncertain refugee grounds, the political opinion 
ground. There is no established or settled meaning of the term political 
opinion. In this Article, the Author examines the history, jurisprudence, 
and the current approach to this concept. The Author argues that the 
current approach is unduly restrictive and not consistent with the 
overarching objective and rationale for the Convention. The Author 
proposes a broader and more jurisprudentially sound definition of 
political opinion. 
The adoption of this Article’s recommendation will provide a 
pathway for a significant increase in the number of displaced people 
that would come within the scope of the Convention. This would not 
provide a holistic or total solution to the displaced persons crisis. 
However, it would significantly enhance the level of flourishing of 
large numbers of people who are currently destitute as a result of being 
displaced from their homeland. The imperative to now rethink the 
definition of a refugee is arguably stronger than at any time in recent 
US history, given the considerable restrictions that have recently been 
put in place in acknowledging refugee claims and granting asylum in 
the United States. 
During the 2016 presidential campaign, President Donald Trump 
called for “‘a total and complete shutdown’ of Muslims entering the 
 
4. Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, UNHCR (2019), 
https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2018/ [https://perma.cc/N9HM-S2K3]. 
5. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse [TRAC], Immigration Court Backlog 
Tool, TRAC IMMIGRATION (Sept. 2019), 
https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/ [https://perma.cc/Z2JS-5JXW]. 
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United States”6 and since the beginning of his presidency, the refugee 
admissions process has continued to be a key priority. In fact, in the 
first week of his presidency, President Trump controversially closed 
American borders to all refugees by issuing an executive order that 
froze the United States refugee admissions program for 120 days and 
banned Syrian refugees indefinitely, who were labeled as “detrimental 
to the interests of the United States.”7 It also included a blanket ninety 
-day travel ban for foreign nationals travelling from several Muslim 
majority countries.8 This ban was eventually abandoned after a series 
of Federal Courts blocked it.9 In its place, the Trump Administration 
issued a somewhat narrower revised order in March 2017, which re-
instated the 120 day suspension of all refugees admissions but replaced 
the indefinite bar on Syrian refugees with a 120 day freeze.10 This too 
was struck down by a Federal Judge before its implementation,11 
however the Supreme Court allowed the order in part, including the 
120 refugee admission suspension, which took effect in late June 
2017.12 Refugee admissions resumed in October 2017, however 
citizens from eleven “high-risk” countries continued to be barred from 
the United States for a further ninety-day review.13 
 
6. Jenna Johnson, Trump Calls for ‘Total and Complete Shutdown of Muslims Entering 
the United States’, WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
politics/wp/2015/12/07/donald-trump-calls-for-total-and-complete-shutdown-of-muslims-
entering-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/8AEY-GD69]. 
7. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017). 
8. Id. at 8978. 
9. Adam Liptak, Court Refuses to Reinstate Travel Ban, Dealing Trump Another Legal 
Loss, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/09/us/politics/appeals-
court-trump-travel-ban.html [https://perma.cc/46LH-ZQAP]. 
10. Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017). 
11. Alexander Burns, 2 Federal Judges Rule Against Trump’s Latest Travel Ban, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/15/us/politics/trump-travel-ban.html 
[https://perma.cc/6WUM-Y29M]. 
12. Robert Barnes & Matt Zapotosky, Supreme Court Allows Limited Version of Trump’s 
Travel Ban to Take Effect and Will Consider Case in Full, WASH. POST (June 26, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-allows-limited-version-
of-trumps-travel-ban-to-take-effect-will-consider-case-in-fall/2017/06/26/97afa314-573e-
11e7-b38e-35fd8e0c288f_story.html [https://perma.cc/J6KF-YMHZ]. 
13. Peter Baker & Adam Liptak, U.S Resumes Taking in Refugees, but 11 Countries Face 
More Review, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/24/us/politics/trump-lifts-refugee-suspension.html 
[https://perma.cc/38AS-T5F2]. For resumption of refugee admissions for the affected countries, 
see Yeganeh Torbati, U.S. to Resume Refugee Admissions From 11 ‘High-risk’ Countries, 
REUTERS (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-refugees/u-s-to-
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Following the expiration of the March 2017 Executive Order, 
President Trump introduced the third iteration of the travel ban in 
September 2017, taking effect the following month.14 After a number 
of challenges in the courts, in a 5-4 decision by the Supreme Court, the 
new order was allowed to be implemented in full.15 This order targets 
citizens from seven countries to varying degrees; of which five are 
Muslim-majority. It is the citizens of these five countries that are 
effectively banned from travelling to the United States.16 Unlike the 
earlier iterations, this ban is not temporary.17 Thus, reshaping the US 
refugee admission program has been a key focus for the Trump 
Administration. Most notably, however, the annual refugee cap is the 
lowest it has ever been since the creation of the modern Refugee 
Program in 1980 which established the ceiling system.18 
The US Government is responsible for setting a cap for the 
number of people fleeing persecution in their home countries allowed 
to enter the United States. In the final year of the Obama 
Administration, the cap was set at 110,000 (this, however, was 
subsequently reduced to 50,000 by President Donald Trump).19 In 
2019, the maximum number of refugees allowed into the United States 
is 30,000.20 However, it is important to emphasize that these ceilings 
are simply targets. For example, in the 2018 fiscal year (FY), the 
refugee ceiling was set at 45,000, but only 22,491 refugees were 
admitted.21 This is currently the lowest record number of admissions 
since the system was established in 1980, and is lower than the 27,131 
 
resume-refugee-admissions-from-11-high-risk-countries-idUSKBN1FI27F 
[https://perma.cc/DE3Q-BE3W]. 
14. Proclamation No. 9645, supra note 10. The seven countries targeted by the travel ban 
are Iran, Syria, Somalia, Yemen, Libya, North Korea, and Venezuela. Id. at 45163. The practical 
effect on North Korean and Venezuelan citizens is limited. Id. 
15. Adam Liptak & Michael D. Shear, Trump’s Travel Ban Is Upheld by Supreme Court, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/26/us/politics/supreme-court-
trump-travel-ban.html [https://perma.cc/8NTS-M7R4]. 
16. Proclamation No. 9645, supra note 10. 
17. Id. 
18. ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31269, REFUGEE ADMISSIONS AND 
RESETTLEMENT POLICY (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31269.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LH3U-CK48]. 
19. Id. at 3. 
20. Id. at 5. 
21. Nayla Rush, Refugee Resettlement Roundup for FY 2019, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. 
(Oct. 4, 2019), https://cis.org/Rush/Refugee-Resettlement-Roundup-FY-2019 
[https://perma.cc/XP65-HXRA]. 
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admissions in FY 2002, following the events of 9/11.22 As of May 31, 
the United States had admitted only 18,051 refugees.23 Not only has 
the Trump Administration lowered the number of people allowed in, 
but it has also sought to heavily exclude certain refugees from seeking 
asylum in the United States. For example, of the 22,491 refugees 
admitted in FY 2018, 16,018 were Christians and 3,495 were 
Muslims—that is, seventy-one percent and sixteen percent 
respectively.24 
To a lesser extent, the decline in refugee admission numbers is 
also due to the tougher vetting procedures and security screening 
measures of refugee applicants.25 The refugee vetting process in the 
United States was already considered to be among the most extensive, 
with the typical application process taking two years to complete.26 
Thus, these additional hurdles not only place an additional barrier on 
those seeking safety, but also have led to unduly long processing times 
to the already overwhelmed refugee processing system. Thus, while the 
refugee cap has been reduced in recent years, processing delays have 
also contributed to these caps not being met. 
In the next part of the Article, the Author provides an overview of 
the current displaced person crisis. This is followed in Part III by an 
examination of the history and background to the Refugee Convention. 
In Part IV, the Author discusses the current approach to the meaning of 
political opinion and argues that it is jurisprudentially and normatively 
flawed. Part V of the Article advances a more coherent and normatively 
sound definition of political opinion. In the concluding remarks, the 
 
22. BRUNO, supra note 18, at 3. 
23. An Overview of U.S. Refugee Law and Policy, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL 3 (June 18, 
2019), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/overview-us-refugee-law-and-
policy [https://perma.cc/6LN6-YCMT]. 
24. Jynnah Radford, Key Findings About U.S. Immigrants, PEW RES. CTR. 9 (June 17, 
2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/17/key-findings-about-u-s-immigrants/ 
[https://perma.cc/CRJ3-YBEP]. 
25. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., Improved Security Procedures for Refugees 
Entering the United States (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/10/24/improved-
security-procedures-refugees-entering-united-states [https://perma.cc/KU2L-8XTQ]. 
26.  U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, Refugee Security Screening Fact Sheet 4–7 
(Aug. 28, 2018), 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Refugee%2C%20Asylum%2C%20and%20Int
%27l%20Ops/Refugee_Screening_and_Vetting_Fact_Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/C8M7-
DG3H]. 
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Author summarizes reform proposals and impact they are likely to have 
in relation to settling a high number of displaced people. 
II. THE CURRENT DISPLACED PERSON CRISIS 
A. Overall Picture Regarding Current Number of Displaced People 
The mass displacement of people who are forced to flee their 
homes due to conflict or violence has long been documented in human 
history. The magnitude of this phenomenon is now at the highest 
recorded level in recent history. The global population of forcibly 
displaced people today is larger than the population of Thailand. In fact, 
if the total global population of forcibly displaced people today were to 
be combined to form their own country, they would be the nineteenth 
largest country in the world.27 
The most illuminating figures are set out in the most recent annual 
study by UN refugee agency, the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (“UNHCR”). According to the UNHCR Global Trends 
Report (“UNHCR Report”),28 in 2018 there were 70.8 million people 
who had been forced to leave their homes and seek safety elsewhere.29 
This is the eighth consecutive year that the world’s forcibly displaced 
population has increased and is 2.3 million higher than the previous 
year.30 This is the highest number of displaced persons recorded since 
the agency began collecting data on displaced persons in 1951.31 
The rate at which the displaced population is growing is 
staggering. The increase in the population of displaced people is 
outstripping the growth of the world’s total population. In 2018, one in 
every 108 people worldwide was forcibly displaced.32 This is 
compared to one in every 160 people a decade ago.33 
The marked rate of displacement is further highlighted by the 
increase in displaced persons over the most recent seven-year period, 
as recorded by UNHCR. In the six-year period from 2012 to 2018, the 
displaced population increased by 25.6 million people—from 45.2 
 
27. UNHCR, supra note 3. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 4. 
30. It was 68.5 million in 2017. Id. at 2 and 5. 
31. Id. at 4. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 4. 
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million to almost 71 million.34 In approaching the issue from a 
somewhat wider lens, the extent of the crisis is further illuminated. In 
1996, there were 37.3 million displaced people in the world. This is an 
increase of 33.5 million people in just over twenty years.35 
As noted by the UNHCR Report, the global population of 
displaced persons is comprised of different cohorts. It consists of 
refugees, who account for almost 26 million; internally displaced 
persons (“IDPs”), who comprise over 41 million people; and asylum 
seekers, who account for about 3.5 million of the total number of 
displaced persons.36 Stateless persons are not accounted for in this 
global total of displaced persons. These are individuals who are not 
considered a citizen of any country and thus are denied basic civil and 
social rights such as access to education, healthcare, and freedom of 
movement. In 2018, UNHCR conservatively estimated that there were 
at least ten million stateless persons worldwide.37 
The Syrian civil war has resulted in the most profound refugee 
and displaced persons problem in the world since World War II 
(“WWII”). It is the single largest driver of displacement. The UNHCR 
Report states that Syria recorded the largest population of displaced 
persons for the fifth consecutive year with a total of thirteen million 
displaced Syrians.38 This figure is comprised of 6.7 million refugees, 
6.2 million internally displaced within the borders of Syria (of which 
2.5 million are children), and 140,000 asylum seekers.39 Other 
countries that registered large displaced person populations included 
Colombia (8 million), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (5.4 
million), Afghanistan (5.1 million), South Sudan (4.2 million), and 
Somalia (3.7 million).40 
As noted above, refugees account for a significant proportion of the 
global displaced population—there are currently more refugees 
worldwide than at any time since WWII. The number of refugees under 
UNHCR’s mandate increased for the eighth consecutive year—from 
 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 2. 
37. Persons of Concern to UNHCR, UNHCR, https://www.unhcr.org/ph/persons-concern-
unhcr [https://perma.cc/HR54-VDF5] (last visited Jan. 22, 2020). 
38. UNHCR, supra note 3, at 6 and 14. 
39. Id. at 6. 
40. Id. at 6–7. 
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10.5 million in 2010,41 to a record high of 20.4 million in 2018.42 There 
were an additional 5.5 million Palestinian refugees registered under the 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency’s mandate.43 When 
combined, the total number of refugees in 2018 stood at twenty-six 
million. The significance of the refugee crisis is further underlined by 
the fact that half of the world’s refugees continue to be children.44 The 
below chart sets out the rapidly growth in world’s displaced population 
in recent years.45 
 
B. The Significant Recent Increase in the Number of Displaced 
People 
The most recent calendar year for which displaced persons figures 
have been reported, demonstrates the persistence and magnitude of this 
unprecedented displacement crisis and further underscores the pressing 
need for a tenable and effective solution. According to UNHCR data, 
during the course of 2018 alone, there were 13.6 million people who 
were newly displaced; of this number, 10.8 million were internally 
displaced inside their own countries, and 2.8 million had sought safety 
 
41. Global Trends 2010, UNHCR 3 (2011), https://www.unhcr.org/4dfa11499.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QA87-8FQV]. 
42. UNHCR, supra note 3, at 13. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 61. 
45. Id. 
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abroad (as refugees or asylum seekers).46 To further illuminate the 
marked rate at which the number of displaced persons is increasing, 
13.6 million people worldwide were newly displaced worldwide in 
2018—that is 37,000 every day.47 
During 2018, there were also 1.1 million people registered as new 
refugees.48 These are persons who sought protection outside their 
country of origin and have either been recognized as a refugee on a 
prima facie basis or granted temporary protection following a refugee 
status determination. Over half of the newly recognized refugees were 
Syrians (520,000), of which almost 400,000 were located in Turkey.49 
In addition, there were 1.7 million new asylum claims submitted in 
2018.50 
Notably, the United States was the world’s largest recipient of 
individual asylum applications for the second consecutive year—with 
254,300 applications submitted.51 A high number of applications were 
also made to Germany and Turkey—161,900 and 83,800 
respectively.52 There are a number of factors which have contributed 
significantly to the high number of new displacements. This includes a 
rise in general violence, unresolved governance challenges, and 
protracted armed conflicts, which have caused large scale deterioration 
in several countries.53 
As noted above, the Syrian civil war had a particularly 
pronounced impact in the global displacement figures since it began in 
2011. In 2018 alone, there were almost 900,000 newly displaced 
Syrians; of this total, 630,000 Syrians fled the country to find safety 
and the remainder were internally displaced within the country.54 
However, it was Ethiopia who accounted for the largest number of 
newly displaced persons in the year. There were almost 1.6 million 
 
46. Id. at 20. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 41. 
51. Id. at 42. 
52. Id. at 3. 
53. See generally id.; Global Report on Internal Displacement (2018), 
http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2018/downloads/2018-GRID.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TBU7-Z4AT]. 
54. UNHCR, supra note 3. 
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newly displaced Ethiopians in 2018 alone—ninety-eight percent were 
displaced within the country.55 
The increase in violence and human rights abuses which has been 
triggered by the deteriorating political and economic conditions in 
Venezuela has also contributed significantly to the growth in displaced 
people in recent years. It is estimated that there was an average of 5,000 
people leaving Venezuela every day in 2018.56 Recent data estimates 
that by mid-2019 the number of Venezuelans leaving the country 
would have reached four million.57 Alarmingly, one million of these 
displacements occurred in the seven months since November 2018.58 It 
is estimated that the total figure could reach eight million by the end of 
2020.59 This mass exodus of Venezuelans is one of the biggest 
displacement crises in recent history—comparable to those 
experienced by war-ravaged Syria. 
C. Key Refugee and Displaced Person Producing Countries 
The top ten refugee producing countries accounted for a 
staggering eighty-two percent of the world’s refugees registered under 
UNHCR’s mandate, which has been a consistent trend over recent 
years.60 That is, 16.6 million of the global total of 20.4 million refugees 
are under UNHCR’s responsibility.61 Even more remarkably, about 
 
55. Id. at 6. 
56. Siegfried Modola, Venezuelan Outflow Continues Unabated, Stands Now at 3.4 
Million, UNHCR 1 (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.unhcr.org/ph/15238-venezuelan-outflow-
continues-unabated-stands-now-at-3-4-million.html [https://perma.cc/SPF2-YGKQ]; Press 
Release, International Organization for Migration [IOM] Venezuelan Outflow Continues 
Unabated, Population Abroad Now Stands at 3.4 Million, at 1 (Feb. 22, 2019), 
https://www.iom.int/news/venezuelan-outflow-continues-unabated-population-abroad-now-
stands-34-million [https://perma.cc/MVS7-5NUC]. 
57. Press Release, IOM, Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela Top 4 Million: UNHCR and 
IOM, at 1 (Jun. 7, 2019), https://www.iom.int/news/refugees-and-migrants-venezuela-top-four-
million-iom-and-
unhcr?utm_source=IOM+External+Mailing+List&utm_campaign=e34c71ed9b-
EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_06_06_07_16&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_9968056566-
e34c71ed9b-43648581 [https://perma.cc/4F9N-2GLY]. 
58. Id. 
59. OAS Working Group to Address the Regional Crisis Caused by Venezuela’s Migrant 
and Refugee Flows, ORG. FOR AM. STATES 19 (June 2019), 
http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/OAS-Report-to-Address-the-regional-crisis-caused-
by-Venezuelas-migrant.pdf [https://perma.cc/EL36-LDZA]. 
60. UNHCR, supra note 3, at 18. 
61. Id. 
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two-thirds of these refugees originate from just five countries—Syria, 
Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar, and Somalia.62 
Syria has continued to produce the world’s highest number of 
refugees, for the fifth consecutive year. As noted above, there were 6.7 
million Syrian refugees reported in 2018.63 This is unprecedented in 
recent history for a single country and is a significant increase since 
2014, when the total displaced population was estimated to be 7.6 
million, of which about 3.9 million were refugees.64 This is the world’s 
biggest refugee crisis. 
The second largest group of refugees were Afghans. In fact, 
Afghanistan was the largest refugee producing country for more than 
thirty years, until 2014 when it was surpassed by Syria.65 In 2018, it 
was estimated that some 2.7 million Afghans had fled the country in 
search of international protection.66 As in previous years, Pakistan 
shouldered the majority of Afghan refugees (over 1.4 million) followed 
by the Islamic Republic of Iran (951,100) in 2018—combined this 
equates to almost ninety percent of the total Afghan refugee 
population.67 
The on-going civil conflict in South Sudan produced the third 
largest refugee group under UNHCR’s mandate, with 2.3 million 
refugees worldwide in 2018.68 The remaining top ten-refugee-
producing countries in 2018 were Myanmar (1.1 million), Somalia 
(900,000), Sudan (724,800), DRC (720,300), Central African Republic 
(590,900), Eritrea (507,300), and Burundi (387,900).69 
In addition to these refugee numbers, there were 2.1 million 
applications for refugee status submitted by asylum seekers across 158 
countries in 2018.70 An asylum seeker is an individual who has sought 
asylum protection outside of their country of origin however their 
application has yet to be assessed. Further, a considerable proportion 
 
62. Id. at 3. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
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of these applications, 1.7 million, were new applicants.71 Venezuelans 
lodged the highest number of asylum claims in 2018 (341,800) with the 
majority made in Peru, Brazil, and the United States.72 Afghans and 
Syrians lodged the second and third highest number of asylum claims 
in 2018, each having made just over 100,000 claims.73 
To further complete the picture regarding countries which have 
produced the highest numbers of displaced persons, just ten countries 
account for seventy-six percent of the world’s total number of IDP’s.74 
As noted above, IDP’s constitute the largest cohort of displaced people 
in 2018, totaling 41 million.75 Colombia registered the highest number 
of IDP’s due to conflict or violence within the country—7.8 million.76 
Other countries that were reported as having high levels of internal 
displacement included Somalia (2.6 million), Ethiopia (2.6 million) 
and, Yemen (2.1 million).77 
D. Poor Countries Continuing to Shoulder Disproportionate Burden 
of Admitting Displaced People 
The data shows that there is an unrelenting trend of poor countries 
bearing a disproportionate burden of the refugee intake. The incidence 
of displaced and refugee persons is heavily concentrated within just a 
few regions. Nine of the top ten refugee hosting countries in 2018 were 
developing countries, and combined hosted eighty-four percent of the 
world’s refugees.78 
More broadly, the data shows that the world’s least developed 
countries (this includes South Sudan, DRC, and Ethiopia—who each 
are among the top ten refugee-hosting countries) host one-third of the 
global refugee total. In other terms, 6.7 million refugees under the 
UNHCR’s mandate are located in the world’s most impoverished 
countries with unstable political and rule of law institutions.79 The 
world’s least developed countries account for only 1.25% of global 
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GDP.80 This is in stark contrast to the 16% of refugees that are hosted 
by high income, developed countries.81 
Looking at it from another measure, low to middle income 
countries host an average of 5.8 refugees per 1000 of population. This 
is in stark comparison to the average of 2.7 per 1000 of population in 
high-income countries.82 The below table sets out the ten countries that 
hosted the largest refugee number of refugees in 2018.83 
 
Turkey was the country most affected by the refugee burden for 
the fifth consecutive year—hosting 3.7 million refugees in 2018.84 This 
is a significant increase from 1.6 million refugees the country hosted in 
2014.85 The refugee population in Turkey is comprised almost 
exclusively of Syrians (ninety-eight percent—this is the largest Syrian 
refugee intake by any single country. Over the course of 2018 alone, 
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Turkey took in about 500,000 new refugees—over 100,000 were 
newborns.86 Pakistan was the second largest host of refugees, with a 
refugee population of 1.4 million, which is almost entirely made up of 
Afghans.87 The third largest country of asylum was Uganda 
(1,165,000) as a result of the conflict in neighboring South Sudan.88 
According to UNHCR, other countries that provided safety for a high 
number of refugees in 2018 included Sudan, Germany, Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Lebanon, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Jordan.89 Thus, 
it is clear from this data that responsibility for the world’s refugee crisis 
is overwhelmingly carried by countries with the least resources to 
absorb and accommodate the needs of those seeking refuge. 
The contrast between refugees and asylum seekers is not the 
source countries of these respective groups, but rather the destinations 
where they are seeking to be located. They are invariably first world 
wealthy countries with the exception of Peru, who experienced a drastic 
increase in asylum applications as a result of the crisis in Venezuela. 
Peru received the second largest number of claims for asylum in 2018 
with 192,500 claims lodged.90 This is compared to 37,800 in 2017 and 
4,400 in 2016.91 
The largest recipient of new individual asylum claims in 2018 was 
the United States, for the second consecutive year. There were 
approximately 250,000 claims lodged.92 As with previous years, 
applicants from Central America and Mexico make up about half of all 
asylum applications to the United States, specifically El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Venezuela93--areas that are considered as one of the 
most violent in the world largely due to the on-going increase in gang-
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related violence.94 A total of 94,000 of these asylum applications 
originated from these three countries alone.95 
As with previous years, Germany continues to receive a high 
number of asylum claims. In 2018, 161,900 were lodged in Germany, 
with Syrians being the most common nationality of these applicants 
(44,200).96 However, this is a significant decrease from the 722,400 
that were submitted in 2016.97 According to UNHCR data, other 
countries which registered the largest numbers of asylum applications 
in 2018 were France (114,500), Turkey (83,800), Brazil (80,000), 
Greece (65,000), Spain (55,700), Canada (55,400), and Italy 
(48,900).98 
E. Overview of the United States’ Response to Accepting Displaced 
People 
Thus, from the above it follows that the United States is one of the 
most common target countries by prospective refugees. The number of 
people seeking asylum in the United States is rapidly increasing given 
the recent upheaval in Venezuela and other parts of Central America. 
The increase in refugee numbers has paradoxically been met by a 
reduction in the refugee cap set by the United States. Even though the 
cap has been reduced, administrative and processing delays have meant 
that even these lower caps have not been filled with refugees that have 
been granted asylum. The entire process of dealing with and processing 
refugee applications is fundamentally broken. There are many political 
and social reasons associated with this, including the appetite that a 
nation has for receiving refugee applicants. 
Another consideration that complicates and compromises the 
refugee pathway is the uncertainty surrounding the characteristics of 
people that qualify as refugees. This is a legal question. If further clarity 
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is injected into the refugee determination process, this will clear the 
pathway for more rational and objective political and social decisions 
to be made regarding refugee quotas and the manner in which asylum 
claims are processed. In the remainder of this Article, the Author 
focuses on this legal issue and more pointedly at the definition of 
political opinion, which is one of the five grounds for refugee status. In 
light of the above, the Author now discusses a pathway to ameliorate 
the refugee crisis in a logical and coherent manner. Prior to doing so 
and to contextualize the Author’s recommendations, the Author 
provides a brief overview on the background and history of the Refugee 
Convention. 
III. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND TO THE REFUGEE 
CONVENTION 
In this part of the Article, the Author provides a brief historical 
review of international refugee protection, specifically looking at a 
number of refugee agreements that were developed in response to a 
number of discrete refugee movements in the aftermath of World War 
I (“WWI”). These instruments had a considerable impact in shaping the 
modern era of refugee law in the form of the 1951 Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees.99 Thus, it is necessary to first examine the 
origin and history of the refugee problem during the early 20th century 
to understand the scope and potential application of the Refugee 
Convention. 
A. The First Agreements 
The twentieth century was a period of mass disturbance and 
movement on a large global scale following numerous political events 
and violent conflicts in Europe. Governments were particularly ill-
prepared for the mass population flows that arose following WWI and 
in the absence of protection obligations on governments or the 
existence of a central body, legal responses by governments to this 
displaced person crisis was not in any regular or systematic manner. 
 
99. U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 
[hereinafter 1951 Refugee Convention]. 
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Rather, those displaced by the war were left largely dependent on the 
material assistance and relief provided by charitable organizations.100 
The earliest refugee group to attract and receive the attention of 
the international community were Russian citizens who had been 
displaced following the breakdown of the Russian Empire.101 This 
group of people faced what were then unprecedented challenges to 
relocation. The first significant obstacle was the sheer number of 
people that were displaced. It is estimated that by 1922, there were at 
least 1.5 million Russian refugees who had been displaced and were 
scattered across Europe—making it the largest post-war group of 
political refugees.102 Although refugees had existed prior to this time, 
large groups of refugees were virtually non-existent. Not only were 
European governments particularly ill-prepared for such a large-scale 
flow of refugees, but the burden created by the Russian refugee crisis 
was further “magnified by the fact that Europe was drained by war: 
stirred by political tensions; and exhausted of capacities to provide 
adequate relief.”103 The mass displacement of Russian refugees was 
further exacerbated by the fact that the relatively free international 
movement accorded to refugees during the 19th century had come to 
an abrupt end following the conclusion of WWI.104 In an effort to 
tighten their borders and control the movements of refugees, 
governments worldwide were adopting more guarded immigration 
policies.105 
These movement restrictions had in fact begun in the United 
States with the enactment of the 1921 and 1924 Immigration Acts, 
which imposed the first numerical quotas on immigration to the United 
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States.106 Not only were restrictions imposed on the number of persons 
that the United States would accept, but it also set caps on the ethnic 
origins of those allowed to enter. For example, under the Immigration 
Act 1924, European immigration was limited to only 150,000 people 
per year and favored certain European countries. For example, the 
annual UK quota was 77,000 compared to the 2,300 cap set for persons 
of Russian origin.107 The increasing reluctance by governments to 
admit refugees was a continuing obstacle for the refugee flows during 
the inter-war period. 
By late 1921, it was becoming increasingly clearer that 
repatriation by the new soviet authorities would not be a tenable 
solution. A 1921 decree had rendered those Russians who had fled the 
revolution stateless, thus depriving them of their citizenship.108 Even 
in the event that such refugees could find a temporary place of asylum, 
governments were reluctant to naturalize them and they were without 
any internationally accepted travel documents to identify themselves 
which would allow them to travel to other countries for safety or to 
work.109 As noted by Skran, “they lived as aliens in foreign lands, often 
with an insecure legal status and subject to expulsion at a moment’s 
notice.”110 The lack of a secure legal identity and ability to travel was 
the most significant problem faced by this group of refugees. 
In response to the mass exodus of Russians, an appeal was made 
by the International Red Cross Committee (“IRCC”), a voluntary 
organization, to the League of Nations to deal with the “Russian 
refugees scattered throughout Europe without legal protection or 
representation.”111 The League of Nations was an international, inter-
governmental organization established in 1919 out of the Treaty of 
Versailles112 with the primary purpose “to promote international co-
operation and to achieve international peace and security” between 
countries in the aftermath of WWI.113 The League provided a forum 
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for its members to discuss and deal with a variety of social and political 
problems, and was the first international organization that addressed 
the refugee problem.114 
The IRCC had appealed to the Council of the League of Nations 
on the basis that the need for action was an issue that went beyond 
humanitarian duty but rather as “an obligation of international 
justice,”115 and that the League of Nations was “the only super national 
political authority capable of solving a problem which is beyond the 
power of exclusively humanitarian organization.”116 The move by the 
Red Cross to frame the refugee crisis in juridical and legal, rather than 
strictly humanitarian terms, encouraged a positive response from the 
Council which, after consulting with member governments, established 
the Office of High Commissioner for Refugees in 1921.117 This was the 
first action that the League undertook on behalf of refugees. 
Dr. Fridtjof Nansen was appointed as the first High Commissioner 
on Behalf of the League in Connection with the Problems of Russian 
Refugees in Europe.”118 The High Commissioner’s mandate included 
defining the legal status of Russian refugees, engaging in attempts to 
organize their repatriation or alternatively facilitating their 
employment opportunities outside of Russia and to coordinate 
assistance and relief efforts.119 
The establishment of the inter-governmental League of Nations 
and the appointment of the Refugee High Commissioner marked an 
awareness by governments as to the need for an international response 
to the refugee problem. It was also under the framework of the League 
of Nations that a number of important legal international instruments 
were developed in an attempt to afford some degree of protection and 
rights to the refugees in inter-war Europe which subsequently marked 
the beginnings of the inter-war era of legal refugee protection. 
The High Commissioner had devoted particular attention to 
securing the legal protection and status of refugees during his mandate. 
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In July 1922, he convened an international conference in Geneva where 
he put forward a proposal for internationally recognized identification 
papers to be issued to Russian refugees.120 This travel certificate—
which became known as the “Nansen Passport”121 was subsequently 
adopted under the Arrangement with Regard to the Issue of Certificates 
of Identity to Russian Refugees (“1922 Arrangement”).122 This was the 
first international legal instrument addressing the legal protection of 
refugees and as noted by Skran, “the beginning of international refugee 
law can properly be dated to the creation of the Nansen passport 
system.”123 Although this was a non-binding agreement, it was 
generally well-received with fifty-four signatory governments.124 
Under the terms of the 1922 Arrangement, governments could 
issue Russian refugees living within their borders with legal identity 
certificates, and renew these documents. Although the certificates were 
not equivalent to a national passport, in that it did not grant citizenship 
rights, or provide the right to return to the country of issue (unless there 
was an express permission within), it did give refugees who were 
effectively stateless somewhat a recognizable legal identity, and 
allowed them to cross national borders and travel internationally more 
freely in an attempt to resettle.125 As noted above, this was one of the 
key challenges faced by these refugees. 
In 1924, the High Commissioner extended the issuance of the 
certificates to approximately 320,000 Armenian refugees126 who had 
been displaced from the former Ottoman Empire under the 1924 Plan 
for the Issue of a Certificate of Identity to Armenian Refugees.127 This 
agreement essentially mimicked the 1922 Arrangement, providing 
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refugees of Armenia with some form of legal recognition and the ability 
to travel.128 
The subsequent 12 May 1926 Arrangement Relating to the Issue 
of a Certificate of Identity to Armenian Refugees (“1926 
Arrangement”)129 made several improvements to these earlier 
arrangements. The most significant among them was the inclusion of a 
return clause to the identity certificates. As mentioned above, the 
certificates at first were relatively limited, however the 1926 
Arrangement recommended that the certificates make provision for a 
return visa if the holder departed the country. Thus, governments would 
undertake to re-admit the holder to the country of issue in an effort to 
enable the “freedom of movement of the refugees.”130 As a result, the 
identity certificates increasingly became accepted as de facto 
“passports.”131 
Significantly, the 1926 Arrangement was the first international 
legal document to contain an explicit definition of a refugee.132 Under 
the earlier 1922 Arrangement and 1924 Plan, eligibility for the issuance 
of an identity certificate was according to certain categories, that is 
Russian or Armenian refugees, without any further elaboration. Thus, 
the focus was simply on whether the person belonged to the relevant 
ethnic group which presented challenges for the governments 
administering the certificate system. The definitions in the 1926 
Arrangement, which had been proposed by the High Commissioner,133 
were relatively narrow. They continued to define a refugee according 
to a particular country of origin, and the fundamental element was that 
the refugee was deprived of the protection by the government in their 
country of origin and had not acquired another nationality.134 
Nonetheless, the 1926 Arrangement became the first international legal 
instrument to define a refugee. The definition was also eventually 
adopted by the 1933 Convention Relating to the International Status of 
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Refugees (“1933 Convention”),135 however it was not without 
criticism, particularly for the lack of scope and emphasis on a lack of 
diplomatic protection in the definition.136 
At a 1928 intergovernmental conference on refugees, the scope 
and legal protections afforded under the Nansen certificate system was 
extended by the League of Nations to other categories of refugees who 
were living in similar conditions as the Russian and Armenian refugees 
under the 30 June 1928 Arrangement Concerning the Extension to 
Other Categories of Refugees of Certain Measures taken in favour of 
Russian and Armenian Refugees.137 This included those of Assyrian 
origin, Assyro-Chaldean persons of Syrian or Kurdish origin as well as 
persons of Turkish origin138 Thus, this continued to emphasize the ad 
hoc, category-oriented approach of classifying refugees according to 
country of origin or group affiliation that was dominant during this 
period, seeking to limit their commitments to known categories and 
staying away from any general description of unknown quantity. 
A second agreement that was concluded under the League of 
Nations, following the 1928 intergovernmental conference, was the 
1928 Arrangement Relating to the Legal Status of Russian and 
Armenian Refugees (“1928 Arrangement”).139 This arrangement was 
effectively an enhanced arrangement on the legal status of Russian and 
Armenian refugees, however it differed markedly from the earlier 
arrangement with regard to one fundamental aspect. The arrangement 
marked the League’s first attempt to confer a range of rights to 
refugees—this included the recognition of the refugees’ personal 
status, including divorce and marriage rights, and contained other 
favorable treatment including rights to work, protection against 
expulsion, and equality in taxation. Notably, the arrangements prior to 
1928 did not establish any specific responsibilities for states other than 
co-operation in the recognition of League of Nations documentation.140 
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The standards contained within the 1928 Arrangement lacked the 
status of treaty law and therefore were not legally binding. They were 
simply recommendations and ultimately reliance on goodwill to deal 
with the mass population flows was insufficient. By the 1930s, 
governments were plagued with enormous political and economic 
instability, and thus had become increasingly unwilling to accept many 
of the defined categories of refugees under these arrangements. In an 
attempt to preserve any entitlements for their own citizens, particularly 
those relating to the work force, governments began promulgating laws 
unfavorable to refugees, particularly dealing with limits on foreign 
workers and further restricting their immigration and asylum laws.141 
B. The 1933 Refugee Convention 
By the late 1920s, the refugee problem was heightened following 
a continuous series of refugee flows throughout Europe and a 
heightened reluctance by refugees and host governments to mass 
naturalizations.142 It had also become clear that these earlier ad hoc 
arrangements were not satisfactory in addressing or providing legal 
protection to address the ongoing mass movements of refugees. As 
noted in a Secretariat memorandum, “with the exception of the Nansen 
passport, the existing so-called arrangements are producing practically 
no effect upon the position of the refugees.”143 
A number of recommendations had been put forward to consider 
creating a formal international legal document with a convention 
foundation on the basis that it would be the best means of securing a 
more permanent solution to the protection of refugees.144 In 1933, the 
League of Nations formally called for a refugee convention and a draft 
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was submitted at an intergovernmental conference in Geneva that 
year.145 
The outcome of the conference was the 1933 Convention,146 
which fully came into force on June 13, 1935. As noted by Louise 
Holborn, the Convention represented a “new stage in the efforts to 
achieve an international legal status for refugees by putting forward a 
set of rules governing important aspects of the refugee problem.”147 
The Convention was applicable to Russian, Armenian, Assyrian, 
Assyro-Chaldean, and Turkish refugees—adopting the narrow 
definitions set out in the 1926 and 1928 Arrangements which greatly 
limited the ambit of protection provided for in the Convention.148 By 
the adoption of these definitions, it is clear that the Convention was 
designed to deal with refugees already under the assistance of the 
League of Nations, specifically the Nansen International Office which 
had been set up in 1930 following the death of the High Commissioner, 
and its purpose was not to aid refugees in a broader sense. 
The Convention guaranteed these refugees a broad range of basic 
civil, political, and economic rights. These included rights in respect of 
identity certificates, education, labor conditions, taxation, expulsion, 
social welfare, and access to courts.149 Moreover, there was an 
emphasis on promoting the principle of equal treatment of refugees by 
governments. As highlighted by Hathaway, “it is noteworthy however, 
that the 1933 convention guaranteed almost all refugee rights either 
absolutely or on terms of equivalency with the citizens of most-
favoured states.”150 Thus, the 1933 Convention placed particular 
emphasis on promoting the concept of equal/same treatment that 
governments should accord to all refugees. However, the drafters 
seemed to merely be consolidating earlier practices as many of these 
rights guaranteed in the Convention simply formalized or enhanced 
those in the 1928 Arrangement.151 
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Importantly, the Convention was the first instrument to set a 
binding obligation on signatory states in relation to expulsion and the 
non-refoulement of refugees,152 which became an increasingly 
common practice during the 1930s.153 This principle means that 
governments should not expel or involuntarily return a refugee to not 
only their country of origin, but any country against their will if there 
is a risk of persecution—this includes the refusal to admit someone at 
the frontier. The right to non-refoulement is considered to be 
fundamental to modern international refugee law. 
Ultimately, only eight states formally ratified and applied the 
provisions of the treaty, however many did so with reservations.154 The 
small number of ratifications coupled with the fact that it only applied 
to certain refugee groups as a result of the narrow definition it had 
adopted of a refugee meant that it had very little practical impact.155 
Nonetheless, the 1933 Convention marked a significant milestone in 
the history of the international refugee regime. It was the first legally 
binding comprehensive instrument addressing the legal protection and 
standard of conduct to be accorded to refugees. It is also significant 
because it served as the foundation of the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
This is perhaps the most important contribution that the 1933 
Convention has made to modern international refugee law. 
In response to a number of specific world events between 1936 
and the adoption of the current refugee convention, a number of ad hoc 
treaties and intergovernmental agreements were formulated in an 
attempt to provide some measure of protection to the affected 
refugees.156 This was driven by the emerging crisis caused by displaced 
German refugees after National Socialism came to power in Germany. 
Although these documents were not a comprehensive approach to the 
refugee issues at the time, they demonstrated an awareness by 
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governments of the international nature of the refugee problem, and 
that refugees were a special category of migrants who deserved special 
attention and should not be sent back to a country of persecution. They 
established important principles that would later be included in the 
Convention. 
C. Refugee Law Following the Second World War 
The years that followed were dominated by dire economic events 
and the outbreak of further violent conflicts, dampening the possibility 
of any further ratifications by states to the Convention. In particular, 
the Second World War marked a new era of mass exodus for millions 
of people. When the war ended in 1945, there were more than 40 
million displaced people who were reluctant or could not return home 
because of border changes—constituting the largest group displaced in 
history.157 
In 1943, prior to the beginning of the war, the United Nations 
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (“UNRRA”) was established 
which relied on cooperation and charitable funding by governments. 
Although it was not created principally as a refugee organization, it had 
a wide-ranging mandate to address the massive groups of refugees 
following the upheaval of WWII. This included measures for providing 
relief and an attempt to repatriate those had been displaced as well as 
assisting with the rehabilitation of war-torn European nations.158 
Following the conclusion of the war, the UNRRA assisted with 
the repatriation of approximately 7 million people.159 However, the 
mandate of the UNRAA was not extended past 1947 after its 
repatriation and rehabilitation efforts were effectively hampered due to 
Cold War tension and opposition from the Soviet Union.160 Further, the 
US Government, who were responsible for providing the majority of 
the UNRRA’s funding, refused to grant any further financial aid to the 
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organization, effectively vetoing the extension of its mandate.161 This 
was largely due to the US Government’s preference to replace the 
UNRRA with an international body with a more wide-ranging capacity 
of operations and authority to deal with the protection of refugees 
displaced in the aftermath of the war.162 
Subsequently, the International Refugee Organization (“IRO”) 
was created in 1947 by a resolution of the recently established United 
Nations General Assembly.163 The IRO was initially established as a 
non-permanent specialized intergovernmental agency of the United 
Nations primarily tasked with providing relief, repatriation, 
resettlement, and protection of refugees displaced within Europe.164 
However, unlike the UNRRA, its efforts focused on the resettlement of 
refugees as opposed to their repatriation.165 Although its work was 
restricted to assisting displaced European refugees, the IRO was the 
first international refugee body to fully address all issues arising from 
the refugee crisis.166 Ultimately, the IRO’s activities formally ceased in 
1952 as a result of its inability to bring the refugee crisis to an end with 
masses of people still adrift in Europe.167 The IRO was the last refugee 
organization to precede the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees.168 It was primarily concerned with offering material 
assistance and making attempts to repatriate or resettle displaced 
persons.169 
D. The 1951 Refugee Convention 
By 1950, the international community recognized that the refugee 
problem sparked by the Second World War was not a temporary one. 
A more durable solution was necessary, especially given that there was 
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no obligation at the time on states to assist refugees. The only 
agreements providing for refugee protection in place were those 
formulated under the League of Nations and created in response to 
specific events that triggered significant refugee movements.170 Thus, 
it was recognized that an instrument with a broader approach would be 
more effective at addressing the ongoing refugee problems. 
The intent of the drafters of this instrument was to revise and 
consolidate the earlier refugee agreements, and to extend their scope of 
protection.171 Specifically, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees was drafted in response to the problems confronting the 
international community as a result of the mass displacement of people 
from Europe following World War II.172 The Convention was also 
viewed as necessary to encourage a more equal sharing of 
responsibility for refugees through the implementation of binding 
obligations.173 
The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was adopted 
on July 28, 1951, and came into force on April 22, 1954.174 The 
Convention was drafted by a combination of United Nations organs, ad 
hoc committees and a conference of plenipotentiaries with the intent of 
ensuring that states could not again turn their backs on vulnerable 
groups escaping persecution and purported to provide a guarantee of 
non-refoulement.175 The Refugee Convention was the first and remains 
the only binding refugee protection instrument of a universal character 
and has become the foundation of the international refugee protection 
regime post WWII. 
The definition of refugee adopted by the Refugee Convention was 
restricted to those persons who had become displaced as a result of 
“events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951” and who were 
unwilling or unable to return to their country of origin because of a 
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well-founded fear of being persecuted for one of five reasons.176 It also 
allowed signatory states to elect to limit their obligations to refugees 
originating from “events occurring within Europe.”177 Thus, these 
limitations make it clear that the Refugee Convention was originally 
drafted with the political goal of directly responding to and assisting 
displaced European refugees who had been affected by the Second 
World War.178 
However, in recognition of the continuing displacement of 
persons across different parts of the world following events unrelated 
to WWII, the Convention was subject to an amendment by the 1967 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (“1967 Protocol”).179 The 
Protocol entered into force on October 4, 1967 and is a separate 
instrument from the 1951 Refugee Convention. Further, accession to it 
is not limited to those states already party to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. The Protocol did not change the refugee definition in any 
material way other than by removing the abovementioned temporal and 
geographical limitations, thereby strengthening the protection of 
refugees. Article 1.2 of the Protocol states “[f]or the purpose of the 
present protocol, the term ‘refugee’ shall . . . mean any person within 
the definition of Article 1 of the convention.” 
Article 1A(2) of the Convention, as amended by the 1967 
Protocol, mandates that refugee status be granted to: 
any person who . . . owing to well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership 
of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country. 
Thus, as the Refugee Convention stands today, the rights and 
protections conferred by the Convention are extended to all refugees, 
and not just those affected by pre-1951 events in Europe.180 Moreover, 
the 1967 Protocol did not broaden rights under the Convention, but 
simply incorporated them by reference under Article 1(1). Thus, in 
effect, the aim of the amendment was to expand the scope of the 
 
176. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 94, art. 1A, (amended by G.A. Res. 2198 (xxi), 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1 (Jan. 31, 1967) [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]. 
177. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 99, art. 1B. 
178. See HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 175. 
179. 1967 Protocol, supra note 176. 
180. See HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 175, at 10. 
534 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43:3 
Convention and allow for the universal coverage and protection of 
refugees. 
However, the Convention definition only applies to specific types 
of displaced people. In other words, to qualify for refugee status, an 
individual must have a well-grounded basis for fearing persecution in 
their homeland. The basis for persecution is not generic. It can only be 
for one of five designated reasons. These are race, religion, nationality, 
political group, or membership in a particular social group. In addition 
to this, in order for the Refugee Convention to be applicable, the 
individual must be outside of their country of origin and unable or 
unwilling to return. These limitations are significant. For example, if a 
person is outside their country of origin and is almost certain to be 
killed if they return to their country of origin because, for example, a 
generalized wide-ranging conflict or they are being targeted by 
powerful criminal gangs or corrupt government officials, they are not 
entitled to invoke the Refugee Convention. 
Importantly, the 1951 Convention continues to provide the 
guarantee of non-refoulement under Article 33. According to this 
principle, a refugee cannot be expelled or returned to a country where 
they may be subject to persecution on account of their race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion.181 However, this right is not conferred upon refugees 
reasonably regarded as posing a risk to national security or considered 
a danger to the community.182 The Convention extends a number of 
other rights to refugees. For example, refugees are entitled to the same 
rights as citizens in relation to freedom of religion, intellectual 
property, access to courts and legal assistance, accessing elementary 
education, labor rights, and social security.183 
As at August 2019, the total number of states party to the 1951 
Convention is 145 and those party to the 1967 Protocol is 146.184 The 
number of states parties to both the Convention and Protocol stands at 
142.185 There are also three countries (including the United States) 
which have agreed to the Protocol only, and two small countries that 
have agreed to the Convention only.186 The Refugee Convention has 
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been responsible for settling more displaced people than any other 
international instrument. Thus, despite the somewhat arbitrary limits 
imposed in the Convention, it has proven to be an incredibly successful 
platform upon which resettlement has occurred for millions of asylum 
seekers. 
E. The Role of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) 
The UNHCR, replacing the IRO, was established by the UN 
General Assembly with a three-year mandate beginning January 1, 
1951.187 It was initially tasked with the goal of providing protection 
and establishing permanent solutions to deal with the refugee crisis.188 
As mandated under Article 2 of the UNHCR Statute, the work of the 
High Commissioner “shall be of an entirely non-political character; it 
shall be humanitarian and social and shall relate, as a rule, to groups 
and categories of refugees.”189 
UNHCR’s mandate and operations were repeatedly renewed to 
address the ongoing refugee movements.190 However, in 2003 the UN 
General Assembly converted the UNHCR into a permanent 
independent agency.191 
It is also important to note that the Refugee Convention and 
UNHCR mandate were drafted at the same time. Thus, the framework 
of the UNHCR was very much built upon and centered around the 
intentions reflected in the Convention—mainly to supervise its 
application by signatory states192 and to assist and seek protection for 
the European refugees displaced in the aftermath of WWII.193 
However, as refugee movements became larger and more complex, the 
Convention refugee definition presented significant limitations on the 
scope and activities of the UNHCR. In response, the mandate of the 
UNHCR was extended by the UN General Assembly to not only assist 
and monitor refugees but also displaced persons who fell outside the 
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scope of the Refugee Convention.194 Although the Convention 
definition itself was not broadened, the UNHCR’s mandate was 
broadened to provide assistance to a number of other categories of 
persons it considers to be of concern.195 This includes internally 
displaced persons, stateless persons, asylum-seekers and also 
returnees.196 
From a staff of thirty-four at the time of its founding, UNHCR 
now employs 16,803 staff as at May 31, 2019. The agency is active in 
over 134 countries and its budget has grown from US$300,000 in its 
first year to more than US$1 billion in the early 1990s and reached a 
new annual high of US$8.6 billion in 2019—funded almost entirely by 
voluntary contributions.197 
F. Summary of International Refugee Instruments 
The above discussion shows that mass people movements are not 
new. There have been several large waves of displaced people 
throughout the twentieth century. On each occasion, countries that 
were affected by these movements found tenable solutions to deal with 
the problem. At times, the solutions were ad hoc while more recently 
they were more wide-ranging. However, none of the solutions were 
perfect and did not involve receiving countries assuming legally 
enforceable obligations to accept displaced people. The world is 
currently experiencing an unprecedented problem associated with the 
forced movement of people. Unlike previous scenarios, there seems to 
be very little appetite by sovereign states to increase their intake of 
displaced people. It does not seem tenable that a new or novel 
agreement or arrangement will be reached which will foreseeably 
resolve or significantly assist the current displaced people crisis. To the 
extent that some nations were willing to absorb significantly increased 
numbers of displaced people, this approach seems to have irretrievably 
stalled. This is highlighted by the reversal in the approach by Germany 
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to admitting displaced people.198 In light of that, part of the solution 
may involve a more expansive interpretation of the existing Refugee 
Convention and it is to that that the Author now turns. 
IV. THE MEANING OF POLITICAL OPINION IN A NUMBER OF 
REFUGEE COUNTRIES 
A. Overview of Meaning of Political Opinion 
Political opinion is one of the five persecution grounds as set out 
in Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention. It states: 
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term ‘refugee’ 
shall apply to any person who: 
(2) . . . owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons 
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality 
and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself 
of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality 
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a 
result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to return to it. 
The meaning of this ground is nebulous. There is no uniform or 
consistent approach that has been taken to its meaning or scope. The 
difficulty in achieving a clear and definitive interpretation can be seen 
across all jurisdictions, with interpretative inconsistencies arising from 
both within and among jurisdictions. The manner in which it is 
interpreted can have significant consequences for the capacity of 
displaced people to obtain asylum in a country outside of their own, 
and also for the obligations of states to absorb refugees within their 
borders. 
One reason for the uncertainty regarding the meaning of political 
opinion is the absence of interpretative guidance provided within the 
Refugee Convention itself. The Refugee Convention does not in any 
way attempt to expressly define the ground nor does it contain any 
examples of the types of opinions that may constitute political opinion 
within the meaning of Article 1A(2). 
The guidance provided by the travaux preparatoires of the 
Refugee Convention in ascertaining the meaning of political opinion is 
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also particularly limited. Reference to these working papers indicate 
that the drafters of the Convention intended that the ground be 
interpreted and applied in an expansive manner to encompass 
“diplomats thrown out of office,” persons “whose political party had 
been outlawed”, and “individuals who fled from revolution.”199 In 
other words, protection under this ground should be not be restricted to 
persons that have an obvious association to a political party or who 
adhere to a formal political ideology.200 
The UNHCR Handbook,201 although not legally binding, has long 
been recognized as a leading source of guidance in interpreting and 
applying the Refugee Convention and Protocol. The Handbook, which 
was republished in 2019, provides the following guidance as to 
ascertaining the boundaries of the ground: 
Holding political opinions different from those of the Government 
is not in itself a ground for claiming refugee status, and an 
applicant must show that he has a fear of persecution for holding 
such opinions. This presupposes that the applicant holds opinions 
not tolerated by the authorities, which are critical of their policies 
or methods. It also presupposes that such opinions have come to 
the notice of the authorities or are attributed by them to the 
applicant.202 
Further, the Handbook explicitly recognizes that a person may 
still qualify for asylum under this ground on the basis of an unexpressed 
political opinion. It states: 
As indicated above, persecution “for reasons of political opinion” 
implies that an applicant holds an opinion that either has been 
expressed or has come to the attention of the authorities. There 
may, however, also be situations in which the applicant has not 
given any expression to his opinions. Due to the strength of his 
convictions, however, it may be reasonable to assume that his 
opinions will sooner or later find expression and that the applicant 
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will, as a result, come into conflict with the authorities. Where this 
can reasonably be assumed, the applicant can be considered to 
have fear of persecution for reasons of political opinion. 
An applicant claiming fear of persecution because of political 
opinion need not show that the authorities of his country of origin 
knew of his opinions before he left the country. He may have 
concealed his political opinion and never have suffered any 
discrimination or persecution. However, the mere fact of refusing 
to avail himself of the protection of his Government, or a refusal 
to return, may disclose the applicant’s true state of mind and give 
rise to fear of persecution. In such circumstances the test of well-
founded fear would be based on an assessment of the 
consequences that an applicant having certain political 
dispositions would have to face if he returned. This applies 
particularly to the so-called refugee “sur place.”203 
The UNHCR has also adopted the somewhat liberal interpretation 
by Goodwin-Gill, who states that the expression “political opinion:” 
Should be understood in the broad sense to incorporate, within 
substantive limitations now developing generally in the field of 
human rights, any opinion or any matter in which the machinery 
of the state, government and policy may be engaged.204 
This definition has been a central pillar in the analysis of this 
ground. The only court to have explicitly adopted the Goodwin-Gill 
interpretation is the Supreme Court of Canada.205 In contrast, a NZ 
tribunal has found that this definition was “too broad to be of any 
meaningful assistance.”206 Ultimately, the courts have disagreed on the 
outer limits of the ground and this notion of breadth creates a tension 
for decision makers who are cautious so as to not “open the flood-gates 
of asylum.”207 
In fact, there are only a handful of decisions in which courts have 
attempted to precisely define or set out a definitive approach to 
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interpreting this ground. The case law that does exist has contributed 
little to the analysis, rather it merely adds to the uncertainty, with a 
number of different approaches emerging. As noted by Hathaway and 
Foster in Law of Refugee Status: 
Among those acts that have been construed as expressions of 
political opinion are public statements regarding the unfair 
distribution of food in Iraq, a public accusation of judicial 
ineptness where such conduct was considered “anti-Islamic,” 
attempts by a Guatemalan literacy teacher to educate the 
population, the preparedness of a Sinhalese travel agent to engage 
in business with Tamil clients, the supply of business services to 
governmental and military institutions, employment by political 
figures including the government, actual, imputed, or implied 
advocacy of human rights, including labor rights, undertaking 
humanitarian work, defection from the KGB, illegal departure or 
stay abroad, the lodgment of a (failed) claim for refugee status 
abroad, and violation of a politically motivated criminal law. Even 
the refusal to declare a political opinion – in other words a position 
of neutrality – might lead to an imputation of a political opinion.208 
These examples of qualifying political opinions are inherently 
conflicting and when considered as a whole illustrates the extent to 
which the interpretations of this ground are unclear in the absence of 
an authoritative definition and has led to an open-ended analysis. 
Broadly however, it is settled law among major common law 
countries—the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, and Australia 
that “the Convention speaks not of political activities but of political 
opinions”209—which is inherently much broader. This is in line with 
the views of the UNHCR above. Thus, the opinion does not necessarily 
need to be expressed or acted upon prior to their departure to be eligible 
for protection.210 There may be various reasons why a person has not 
expressed their political opinion. For example, it may have been 
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practically impossible to express a non-conforming political opinion 
while in the home state and great risks associated with that.211 
Moreover, an applicant for refugee status does not even need to 
hold the opinion that has created the risk of persecution. It is widely 
accepted that a political asylum claim can be grounded on the basis of 
an opinion that has been attributed to the applicant, even if that opinion 
has been falsely attributed. This is known as the imputed political 
opinion doctrine.212 For example, an opinion may be attributed to an 
applicant based on their past association, family ties, or social class. 
The question in such cases is whether the persecutor views the person 
as holding a political opinion. Given that in most imputed political 
claims there will be no direct evidence, it will be up to the decision 
maker to speculate about the persecutor’s perceptions. This presents 
problems in itself and the case law highlights a vastly varied approach 
by decision makers in their attitude towards imputing a political 
opinion. 
In either case, whether the refugee claim is based on an actual or 
imputed opinion, the decision maker must decide whether there is 
reason to believe that the holding or attribution of such opinion will 
place them in jeopardy upon return to their home state.213 Thus, for 
asylum purposes, the Convention requires a forward-looking 
assessment of the risk. Both the UNHCR and courts have generally 
held that to satisfy this requirement, the persecutor must be on notice 
of an applicant’s alleged opinion, and the persecutor is not willing to 
tolerate the applicant’s political opinion.214 In other terms, the opinion 
must be discernable in some way, otherwise, there is no basis on which 
a potential persecutor could possibly form a view. The situation 
therefore is clearest where there has been some action consistent with 
that opinion. 
Moreover, not every opinion will create a risk of persecution and 
therefore qualify for protection. The opinion must be political in nature. 
The notion of opinion has not caused any controversy or generated any 
analysis. In contrast, decision makers have extensively grappled with 
what ought to be considered political in the context of the Refugee 
Convention. 
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The application of political opinion is particularly straight 
forward when there has been an opinion that has been expressed in an 
overt manner and it concerns formal political structures, such as the 
government of the day or some other element regarding the state. 
However, as is clear through recent jurisprudence, many political 
opinion claims do not fit within these parameters. 
There have been a number of trouble spots that have arisen in this 
context. For example, one of the most troublesome issues is the 
widespread disagreement among decision makers about whether or not 
political opinion should be defined by reference to an engagement with 
the government or the state—as per the Guy Goodwin-Gill 
definition.215 Another complexity that has arisen is whether refusing to 
hold a political opinion comes within the scope of the ground. The 
complexities underpinning this area of law are now fleshed out more 
fully in the context of examining the relevant jurisprudence in leading 
refugee law jurisdictions. 
B. United States 
The Refugee Convention definition was first codified in domestic 
United States law under the Refugee Act of 1980,216 described as “the 
most comprehensive US law ever enacted concerning refugee 
admissions and resettlement.”217 The Act intended to ensure US 
immigration law was consistent with its rights and obligations under 
the Refugee Convention and as such incorporated a new definition of 
the term refugee that was in line with the Convention definition.218 The 
Refugee Act modified the 1952 US Immigration and Nationality Act 
(“INA”) by codifying the definition of a refugee.  It defines a refugee 
as a person who is “outside the United States and is unable or unwilling 
to return to his or her country of origin because of persecution or a well-
 
215. It appears that such a connection to the government, policy or the state is required by 
the majority in Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992), 
whereas in Canada (Attorney-General) v. Ward [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 (Can.) it is not a 
requirement. 
216. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96 – 212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980). The United States 
did not sign the Refugee Convention. However, it adopted the obligations under the Refugee 
Convention by accession to the 1967 Protocol. The 1967 Protocol explicitly incorporated the 
convention refugee definition. 
217. Arnold H. Leibowitz, The Refugee Act of 1980: Problems and Congressional 
Concerns, 467 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 163, 164 (1983). 
218.  Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 216. 
2020] THE REFUGEES CONVENTION 543 
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”219 
Political opinion is not defined under the INA. Further, as was the 
case with the legislative history of the Convention, the US Congress 
did not provide any guidance as to the meaning intended to attach to 
the political opinion ground. As a result of this, the meaning of political 
opinion in the US context has been given shape through determinations 
by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and US courts. There 
has been no clear interpretation of the ground, with a number of 
divergent approaches emerging at each level. There are diverging 
standards as to what the applicant must satisfy which has resulted in a 
body of asylum law that is difficult to reconcile and inconsistent. 
US courts have unambiguously recognized claims which involve 
the overt expression of an opinion and that has been tied to a formal 
political party or ideology. For example, where the opinion has been 
evidenced through organizational membership, including association 
with a dissident party and related organizations, and memberships in 
organizations that promote social, cultural, economic, or political 
rights, such as labor unions.220 These claims are generally 
uncontroversial and do not result in much analysis. 
However, US courts have been reluctant to grant asylum in 
circumstances where there is no cognizable political opinion. That is, 
where the asylum seeker can show no overt manifestation of such 
opinion. This has commonly arisen in the context of forced recruitment 
by gangs, in which case the principle question is whether the refusal to 
engage in combat constitutes a political choice for neutrality. 
In the seminal political asylum case of Immigration & 
Naturalization Service v. Elias-Zacarias,221 the US Supreme Court was 
faced with this issue. Notably, the Court did not embark on any attempt 
to ascertain the meaning and scope of political opinion and in the 
absence of a formal definition, the decision has generated an unclear 
and conflicting body of political asylum jurisprudence. In that case, the 
applicant (Elias-Zacarias) had sought asylum in the United States after 
an anti-government guerrilla organization in Guatemala unsuccessfully 
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attempted to recruit him to join them in their war against the 
Government. Elias-Zacarias supported neither side in the conflict and 
subsequently fled to the United States believing that the guerrillas 
would retaliate against him for his refusal to join them, in an attempt to 
remain neutral.222 The Ninth Circuit court’s ruling in favor of Elias-
Zacarias was reversed in a 6-3 majority decision by the Supreme Court. 
The question before the Court was whether the forced participation in 
a guerilla organization constituted “persecution on account of. . . 
political opinion.”223  
On the issue of whether neutrality qualifies as a basis for political 
asylum under the Refugee Act, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority 
stated that it is “not ordinarily” an “affirmative expression of a political 
opinion.”224 The Court did not meaningfully elaborate on this. Despite 
leaving this question open, Justice Scalia went on to inquire into Elias-
Zacarias’ motivation for refusing recruitment. According to the Court, 
even if Elias-Zacarias’ refusal did constitute an affirmative expression 
of his neutrality, it must have been politically motivated. The Court 
reasoned that “even a person who supports a guerrilla movement might 
resist recruitment for a variety of reasons-fear of combat, a desire to 
remain with one’s family and friends, a desire to earn a better living in 
civilian life, to mention only a few.”225 Because Elias-Zacarias had 
testified that he was “afraid that the government would retaliate against 
him and his family if he did join the guerrillas” this evinced the 
“opposite” of a political motive on his part.226 
This is in stark contrast to the position taken by the 9th Circuit, 
who prior to this decision, had held that it was improper to examine the 
applicant’s motives in holding their belief: 
We have several reasons for reaching the conclusion that the 
government may not look behind the manifestation of an alien’s 
political opinion and seek to determine why he made a particular 
political choice. First, it is simply improper for the government to 
inquire into the motives underlying an individual’s political 
decisions. Second, the motives frequently will be both complex 
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and difficult to ascertain; it may not be possible to separate the 
political from the non-political aspects. What standards would we 
use, for example, to determine whether a choice was sufficiently 
based on political principles or whether economic self-interest was 
the determinative factor? Third, and perhaps most important, it is 
irrelevant why the individual made his choice. It does not matter 
to the persecutors what the individual’s motivation is. The 
guerrillas in El Salvador do not inquire into the reasoning process 
of those who insist on remaining neutral and refuse to join their 
cause. They are concerned only with an act that constitutes an 
overt manifestation of a political opinion. Persecution because of 
that overt manifestation is persecution because of a political 
opinion.”227 
Justice Stevens (who was joined by Justices Blackmun and 
O’Connor) in his dissent, criticized the majority for their “narrow” and 
“grudging” opinion. According to Stevens, “a political opinion can be 
expressed negatively as well as affirmatively” and therefore Elias-
Zacarias’ refusal did constitute a political expression that would qualify 
under the ground. Moreover, his opinion was not any less political 
because it was motivated by fear.228 As explained by Stevens, “even if 
the refusal is motivated by nothing more than a simple desire to 
continue living an ordinary life with one’s family, it is the kind of 
political expression that the asylum provisions of the statute were 
intended to protect.”229 
Ultimately, Justice Scalia did not feel compelled to decide 
whether Elias-Zacarias did in fact hold a political opinion because even 
if he did, he failed to establish that he had “a ‘well-founded fear that 
. . . on account of that opinion.”230 According to Justice Scalia, 
“persecution on account of . . . political opinion’ in § 101(a)(42) is 
persecution on account of the victim’s political opinion, not the 
persecutor’s.”231 He arrived at this interpretation based solely on “the 
assumption that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary 
meaning of the words used.”232 
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The Court held that Elias had failed to demonstrate that the 
guerrillas would persecute him “because of that political opinion, rather 
than because of his refusal to fight with them. . . .”233 In the Court’s 
view, the guerrilla organization’s interest in Elias-Zacarias would 
likely be for the purposes of augmenting their troops and not to express 
their displeasure at his refusal to join/fight with them.234 
This is an additional burden that applicants must meet to justify 
the grant of political asylum. An applicant must show a causal nexus 
between the political opinion and the threatened harm. “The mere 
existence of a generalized ‘political’ motive underlying the persecutors 
actions is no longer sufficient to draw an inference that persecution is 
on account of political opinion.”235 The Court did not meaningfully 
elaborate on how an applicant is to prove the persecutors motive, but 
“since the statute makes motive critical, he must provide some evidence 
of it, direct or circumstantial.”236 
Following Elias-Zacarias, it appears that decision makers have 
held that subjectively holding a political opinion will not establish a 
claim. There must be an affirmative expression of a political opinion. 
In addition to this, evidence must be produced to establish that the 
persecutor will be motivated by that opinion. Thus, the Court’s decision 
has narrowed the availability of political asylum by increasing the 
standard that applicants must meet to satisfy a claim on this ground.237 
It is noteworthy that this decision has been heavily criticized by 
observers and legal scholars, particularly for its lack of consideration 
to interpretative aids in requiring that applicants prove their 
persecutor’s intent and lack of consideration for international 
jurisprudence. For example, the Chair of Canada’s Immigration and 
Refugee Board criticized the majority opinion for its failure to “cite a 
single international precedent, judicial or academic” and noted that 
most jurisdictions throughout the world had found that the refusal to 
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join a guerilla group constitutes a political opinion.238 The majority also 
failed to consider the UNHCR Handbook, which acknowledges the 
inherent difficulties asylum applicants face in obtaining evidence to 
support their claim. It states, “it is hardly possible for a refugee to 
‘prove’ every part of his case and, indeed, if this were a requirement 
the majority of refugees would not be recognized.”239 On the issue of 
an imputed political opinion, no meaningful analysis was provided by 
the Supreme Court in Elias-Zacarias. The Court simply stated that 
there was nothing to suggest “that the guerrillas erroneously believed 
that Elias refusal was politically based.”240 It should also be noted that 
the INA does not provide any guidance as to whether an imputed 
political opinion is a ground for asylum. 
The circuit courts do, however, seem to agree that an applicant 
can satisfy a claim for political asylum based on an opinion that the 
persecutor has been attributed to them.241 In such cases, attention turns 
to the views of the persecutor. The applicant must provide evidence 
that the persecutors actually believed that he or she held a political 
opinion.242 The applicant must also provide direct or circumstantial 
evidence that the persecutor was motivated because of that political 
opinion.243 In contrast, the BIA have been particularly hesitant to 
recognize the doctrine of imputed opinion.244 
C. Canada 
The position in the United States regarding the meaning of 
political opinion can be contrasted with that adopted in Canada. The 
leading authority on the definition of political opinion in Canada is the 
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Supreme Court decision of Canada (Attorney-General) v. Ward.245 The 
decision in Ward marks the first attempt by a superior court to attempt 
to delineate the meaning and scope of the ground. However, even 
within Canada, Ward has created uncertainty and inconsistency among 
decisions.246 
Ward was a member of an Irish paramilitary group, the Irish 
National Liberation Party (“INLA”), which, according to the Court, 
was “more violent than the Irish Republican Army.”247 Ward was 
ordered to guard and execute two hostages. Instead, he secretly released 
them because as a matter of conscience he felt that he could not kill 
innocent hostages. He subsequently fled to Canada in fear of 
punishment by the INLA, where he applied for refugee status. 
In delivering the judgement, La Forest J observed that political 
opinion has previously been interpreted as existing where persons fear 
persecution on the basis “that they are alleged or known to hold 
opinions contrary to or critical of the policies of the government or 
ruling party.”248 In his view, this interpretation is inaccurate because: 
This definition assumed that the persecution from whom the 
claimant is fleeing is always the government or ruling party, or at 
least some party having parallel interests to those of the 
government. . . . however, the Convention applies where the State 
is not an accomplice to the persecution, but is simply unable to 
protect the claimant. In such cases, it is possible that a claimant 
may be seen as a threat by a group unrelated, and perhaps 
even opposed, to the government because of his or her political 
viewpoint, perceived or real.249 (emphasis added) 
Although La Forest J appears to suggest that political asylum may 
be granted where the persecutor is not the state, he goes on to cite with 
approval the Goodwin-Gill definition, as noted above. That is, that 
political opinion should be understood broadly to include “any matter 
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in which the machinery of state, government, and policy may be 
engaged.”250 Thus, some linkage to the engagement of the government 
or the state is needed to turn an opinion into one that is political. 
However, according to La Forest J, there are two refinements 
needed to be made to Goodwin-Gill’s analysis: 
First, the political opinion at issue need not have been expressed 
outright. In many cases, the claimant is not even given the 
opportunity to articulate his or her beliefs, but these can be 
perceived from his or her actions. In such situations, the political 
opinion that constitutes the basis for the claimant’s well-founded 
fear of persecution is said to be imputed to the claimant. The 
absence of expression in words may make it more difficult for the 
claimant to establish the relationship between that opinion and the 
feared persecution, but it does not preclude protection of the 
claimant. 
Second, the political opinion ascribed to the claimant and for 
which he or she fears persecution need not necessarily conform to 
the claimant’s true beliefs. The examination of the circumstances 
should be approached from the perspective of the persecutor, since 
that is the perspective that is determinative in inciting the 
persecution. The political opinion that lies at the root of the 
persecution, therefore, need not necessarily be correctly attributed 
to the claimant. Similar considerations would seem to apply to 
other bases of persecution.251 
Under this standard, the Court ultimately found that the 
applicant’s political opposition to the tactics of the INLA could be 
imputed to him on the basis of his conduct in releasing the hostages he 
was ordered to guard. The Court held: 
To Ward, who believes that the killing of innocent people to 
achieve political change is unacceptable, setting the hostages free 
was the only option that accorded with his conscience. The fact 
that he had or did not renounce his sympathies for the more general 
goals of the INLA does not affect this. This act, on the other hand, 
made Ward a political traitor in the eyes of a militant para-military 
organization, such as the INLA, which supports the use of terrorist 
tactics to achieve its ends. The act was not merely an isolated 
incident devoid of greater implications. Whether viewed from 
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Ward’s or the INLA’s perspective, the act is politically significant. 
The persecution Ward fears stems from his political opinion as 
manifested by this act.252 
At first instance, the opinion imputed to Ward does not appear to 
be political. However, the Court took a very expansive view of the 
meaning of political opinion to include firstly a reluctance to act in the 
way required or requested by an organization, even in circumstances 
where there is no express disagreement with the organization’s values. 
Secondly, the Court stated that the context in which an opinion is 
political does not need to directly relate to the state entity but instead 
includes institutions or entities which are involved in attempting to 
shape the policies and practices of the state. It must be emphasized that 
in determining whether the applicant is imputed with a political 
opinion, the reference point is not the actual express or implied views 
of the applicant, but rather the perception of the persecutor. If the 
persecutor believes, even wrongly, that the sentiment of the applicant 
which the persecutor finds objectionable is political in nature, that is 
sufficient to attract the operation of this ground. 
Another manner in which Ward expanded the scope of political 
opinion was that the Court did not require the applicant to establish a 
causal nexus between the suggested political imputation and the 
persecution. Unlike the decision in Elias-Zacarias, La Forest J did not 
appear to place any emphasis on the persecutor’s motives. In other 
words, his Honor did not consider the possibility that the INLA may be 
motivated to harm Ward for non-political reasons, which may have 
included a desire to punish him for being disobedient as opposed to 
being a political traitor. 
The application of this principle in the US context has been 
considered in Elias-Zacarias but as noted above, has not been firmly 
answered, apart from the fact that US courts have indicated that a casual 
nexus between the political imputation and the persecution needs to be 
established. 
D. Australia 
There has been no attempt by an Australian court to define the 
parameters of the political opinion ground, however they have 
 
252. Id. 
2020] THE REFUGEES CONVENTION 551 
described political opinions as being “diverse, imprecise, and even 
idiosyncratic.”253 In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs 
v Y,254 Davies J held that “[t]he words ‘political opinion’ are ordinary 
words of the English language and have not been the subject of judicial 
exposition limiting their meaning in the context of the Refugees’ 
Convention.”255 
Australian courts have accepted the position that the ground be 
interpreted in a broad manner, and that it not be limited to opinions that 
have been overtly expressed.256 Moreover, in line with Ward, 
Australian courts appear to affirm that political asylum is available 
where the persecutor is not the state. Thus, the ground extends to 
actions that are perceived to be a challenge by a group that is opposed 
to the state or government.257 
The clearest articulation of the ground is that by the Federal Court 
in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Y.258 In 
considering whether the Refugee Review Tribunal was correct in 
holding that the applicant’s stance against systemic corruption by 
government officers qualified as a political opinion, Davies J 
articulated the following principles: 
In the context of the Refugees’ Convention, an opinion could be 
thought to be a political opinion if it were such as to indicate that 
its holder . . . held views which were contrary to the interests of 
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the State, including the authorities of the State. A person may be 
regarded as an enemy of the State by virtue of holding and 
propounding views which are contrary to the views of the State or 
its Government, or which are antithetic to the Government and the 
instruments which enforce the power of the State, such as the 
armed Forces, Security Forces and Police Forces or which express 
opposition to matters such as the structure of the State or the 
territory occupied by it and like matters.259 
This reasoning was cited with approval by the Full Court of the Federal 
Court in V v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs,260 which 
similarly concerned an applicant who had expressed an attitude of 
resistance to corruption by police officers. Wilcox J stated: 
As I understand Davies J, as a matter of law it is enough that a 
person holds (or is believed to hold) views antithetic to instruments 
of government and is persecuted for that reasons. It is not 
necessary that the person be a member of a political party or other 
public organisation or that the person’s opposition to the 
instruments of government be a matter of public knowledge. Of 
course, the higher the person’s political profile, the easier it may 
be to persuade a tribunal of fact that the person has been persecuted 
on account of political opinion, rather than for some other reason; 
but that is a matter going to proof of the facts, not a matter of 
law.261 
In the same case, Hill J stated: 
It is not necessary in this case to attempt a comprehensive 
definition of what constitutes ’political opinion’ within the 
meaning of the Convention. It clearly is not limited to party 
politics in the sense that expression is understood in a 
parliamentary democracy. It is probably narrower that the usage of 
the word in connection with the science of politics, where it may 
extend to almost every aspect of society. It suffices here to say that 
the holding of an opinion inconsistent with that held by the 
government of a country explicitly by reference to views contained 
in a political platform or implicitly by acts . . . With respect, I agree 
with the view expressed by Davies J in Minister for Immigration 
and Ethnic Affairs v Y . . . that views antithetical to 
instrumentalities of government such as the Armed Forces, 
 
259. Id. 
260. V v Minister, supra note 209. 
261. Id. at 363. 
2020] THE REFUGEES CONVENTION 553 
security institutions and the police can constitute political opinions 
for the purposes of the Convention. Whether they do so will 
depend upon the facts of the particular case.262 
In applying the Full Federal Court’s decision, Justice Merkel in 
Zheng v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs held that 
resistance to systemic corruption and illegality in some circumstances 
be regarded as a manifestation of a political opinion.263 The Court held: 
. . . exposure of corruption can, in a wide range of circumstances, 
lead to political persecution. Thus, exposure of corruption in 
circumstances where it so permeates government as to become 
part of its very fabric can quite easily lead to a fear that the 
exposure, of itself, may be imputed to be an act of opposition to 
the machinery, authority or governance of the state. Likewise, 
refusal to participate in a corrupt state system can also be seen as 
an expression or manifestation of political opinion as the refusal 
to participate may be imputed by the authorities to be a challenge 
to the machinery, authority or governance of the state. Also, . . . 
exposure of systemic corruption may be an expression of “political 
opinion” even if the state is against corruption but is unable to 
protect the applicant from persecution on this account. In such a 
case, however, it may be difficult to establish that the exposure of 
corruption is a manifestation of a political act such as defiance of, 
or opposition to, the machinery, authority or governance of the 
state.264 
Australian courts have also embraced the imputed political 
opinion doctrine. In Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo, 
the High Court confirmed that persons claiming refugee status may do 
so on the basis of an imputed political opinion. For the purposes of the 
Convention, a political opinion need not be an opinion that is actually 
held by the refugee. It is sufficient for those purposes that such an 
opinion is imputed to him or her by the persecutor. In Chan, Gaudron 
J said: 
“persecution may as equally be constituted by the infliction of 
harm on the basis of perceived political belief as of actual belief.” 
In the same case, McHugh J said that: 
 
262. Id. at 367. 
263. Zheng v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 670 (23 
August 2000) ¶¶ 13-34 (Austl.) [hereinafter Zheng v Minister]. 
264. Id. ¶ 32. 
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“It is irrelevant that the appellant may not have held the opinions 
attributed to him. What matters is that the authorities identified 
[Mr Chan ] with those opinions and, in consequence, restricted his 
liberty for a long and indeterminate period.”265 
A political opinion may be imputed, for example, based on a 
person’s membership of a political party, an entity perceived to hold or 
express political views, or simply on the basis of a person’s family 
connections, race or ethnicity. It is important to emphasize however 
that in the Australian context, the determinative factor has centered 
around the perception and motivation of the persecutor. It is not enough 
that an applicant may be politically motivated. The ‘critical issue’ is 
whether the applicant can establish that the persecution is politically 
motivated.266 
In Zheng v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs the 
Federal Court of Australia held that “exposure of corruption or 
whistleblowing can result in persecution by reason of an actual or 
imputed political opinion’,267 however, ‘a critical issue will 
always be whether there is a causal nexus between the actual or 
perceived political opinion said to have been manifested by the 
exposure of corruption and the well-founded fear of 
persecution’.268 
 
Thus, Australian case law appears to simply endorse the broadly 
accepted, uncontroversial principles that have arisen in the analysis of 
the ground. It follows that there has been no considered jurisprudence 
in Australia on the meaning of political opinion. The cases that turn on 
this issue often expressly state there is no need for an extensive analysis 
of the concept and instead base their decisions on the facts of the case. 
 
265. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 144 ALR 567, 570-71 
(Austl.). See also Saliba v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 89 FCR 
38, 49 (Austl.); Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Y [1998] FCA 515 (15 
May 1998) (Austl.) and NAEU of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and 
Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 259 (24 October 2002) (Austl.). 
266. See NAEU of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous 
Affairs [2002] FCAFC 259 (24 October 2002) (Austl.). See also Applicant A v Minister for 
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225 (Austl.). Zheng v Minister for Immigration 
and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 670 (23 August 2000) [34] (Austl.). 
267. [2000] FCA 670 (23 August 2000) [34] (Austl.) at 19. 
268. [2000] FCA 670 (23 August 2000) [34] (Austl.) at 34. 
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V. PROPOSED NEW DEFINITION OF POLITICAL OPINION 
It follows from the above that there is no settled and clear meaning 
of political opinion or the concept of an imputed political opinion. A 
telling feature of the above analysis is that there is no consistency 
regarding the approach to political opinion in the above jurisdictions. 
This is despite the fact that ostensibly, they are all interpreting the same 
legal instrument. This is of course not uncommon given that each of 
the three countries is sovereign and not bound to follow or even give 
meaningful weight to decisions by courts and other legal bodies in other 
countries. However, what is unusual and unexpected from the analysis 
of the above cases is the disinclination by courts in all of the above 
jurisdictions, with the possible exception of Canada, to meaningfully 
and fully consider the definition and scope of the political opinion 
ground. This is the case especially given the importance that decisions 
relating to refugee applications have on the welfare of asylum 
applicants. 
There have been no systematic and deep doctrinal endeavors to 
articulate in an informative and compelling manner the nature and 
scope of the definition of political opinion and the boundaries of this 
concept. This has the regrettable effect of making decisions in this area 
inconsistent and unpredictable. This uncertainty can also undoubtedly 
create a hesitation to attempt to claim asylum on this basis. It is 
imperative that this concept is given fuller legal attention and its 
parameters more definitively circumscribed. In order to do this, it is 
necessary to revert to the purpose of the Convention and to also be 
cognizant of the evidential manner in which refugee claims are 
determined. 
Consistent with the aims and historical backdrop to the 
Convention, all of the grounds, including political opinion, should be 
given the broadest interpretation which is coherent and in accordance 
with the connotation of the phrases. In relation to political opinion, the 
key concept is that of politics. This is a fluid and evolving term. A 
strong argument can be mounted that most areas of human endeavor 
and human discourse have a political aspect given that decisions in the 
political domain have the capacity to influence all areas of society. It is 
this reference point that should guide the manner in which political 
opinion is interpreted. 
As we have seen, a sticking point that has arisen is whether or not 
the decision to not hold a political opinion merits protection. This issue 
has arisen frequently in the context of a refusal to adhere to the 
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ideologies of or to join a violent group. In a landmark decision in 2012, 
the UK Supreme Court held that the expression of neutrality merits 
protection under the Convention, regardless of the underlying 
motivation.269 The Court held that doing nothing at all was the essence 
of an expression of neutrality and refused to draw a distinction between 
“conscientious or committed” neutrality and that which is simply a 
matter of indifference.270 
This is in stark contrast to the position taken by the US Supreme 
Court who despite being faced with the question, declined to rule on 
the issue of neutrality.271 It did however indicate that affirmative 
conduct is needed to support the neutral opinion and said that the 
motivation behind the neutral opinion is relevant. The failure of the US 
Supreme Court to provide a firm decision in Elias-Zacarias has 
resulted in confusion and a narrowing of the ground.272 Denying 
asylum to neutrals is inconsistent with the purposes of the Convention. 
This tension is very important regarding current refugee flows to 
the United States. This is because an increasing majority of asylum 
claims lodged to the United States are made by applicants who are at 
risk of persecution by violent criminal groups due to their opposing or, 
in some cases, neutral political opinions. Examples of such groups 
include guerilla organizations, drug cartels, and street gangs. These 
groups are extremely prevalent in Central America, which is 
considered one of the most violent regions in world, and as noted 
above, Central America persons make up about half of all asylum 
applications to the United States.273 
In fact, an enormous amount of recent refugee aspirants to the 
United States have left their country because of the political volatility 
and their opposition to events in their homeland. Venezuela is a good 
example. The violent, fragile and unstable political landscape in 
 
269. RT (Zimbabwe) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 38 
(UK). 
270. Id. 
271. See Elias Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483. 
272. Mejilla-Romero v. Holder, 600 F.3d 63, 72 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding that “mere refusal 
to join a gang does not constitute political opinion” even in circumstances where the Applicant 
can show that the persecution was motivated by the resistance to gang recruitment). See also 
Matter of S-E-G, 24 I.&N. Dec. 579, 588 (B.I.A. 2008) and Matter of E-A-G, 24 I.&N. Dec. 
591, 596 (B.I.A. 2008). See also Sangha, 103 F.3d at 1490 (“In Elias Zacarias the Supreme 
Court instructed us to change course. It held that an applicant’s refusal to fight in the context of 
a forced recruitment is not enough by itself to show that the persecutor acted ‘on account of’ his 
political views.”). 
273. See Section I.D. 
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Venezuela has resulted in the breakdown of the economic and social 
institutions in that country. It has also led to an almost total fracturing 
of the rule of law and unwillingness or inability of the government to 
maintain community safety. In this context, most people simply do not 
feel empowered to express opposition to any political acts. This will be 
futile because it will not change events and it is likely in many cases to 
endanger their safety. 
Nevertheless, the core reason that many people are leaving 
Venezuela is because of the extreme political events currently 
unfolding in that country. It is these political events and people’s 
beliefs and their opinions relating to those events that have motivated 
them to seek asylum elsewhere. To assert that people in this group are 
not seeking asylum because of their political opinion is a fundamental 
misconception of the events underpinning their decisions and the 
logical process which they undertook, leading to the decision to leave 
their homeland. Thus, it is imperative that the reasoning in Elias-
Zacarias is overturned. A broader definition of political opinion should 
be adopted in keeping with that in the United Kingdom. This in fact is 
the approach that has been taken in many parts of Europe, where 
asylum seekers who are similarly placed to those leaving Venezuela, 
specifically Syrians, are being granted asylum.274 
Another aspect of the definition of political opinion which is 
unsatisfactorily dealt with in the relevant jurisprudence relates to the 
issue of causation. There have been numerous decisions in the United 
States and elsewhere where decision makers have accepted that a 
refugee applicant has an adverse political opinion, but then ruled that 
this is not the casual basis for the fear of persecution that the applicant 
may have. 
This approach is in nearly all cases logically and empirically 
flawed because there is no causal standard that has been set by the 
courts or legislature that needs to be established in order for a refugee 
claim to be substantiated. A reading of the relevant authorities suggests 
that the causation element is being used as a convenient linguistic tool 
to deny refugee status and to quite often facilitate not carefully 
grappling with closely examining and defining the meaning of political 
opinion and its relevance to a particular case. 
 
274. Allison Hall, Means or Ends? A Comparative Note and Reflection on “Imputed 
Political Opinion” Asylum in the United States and Europe, 79 U. PITT. L. REV. 105 (2017) 
(Note the UNHCR published a guidance note suggesting that this ground serves as a successful 
basis for protection in the context of Syrians). 
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Clearly a jurisprudentially sound approach needs to be established 
and applied by the courts. To this end, in numerous other areas of law 
including criminal law and torts it has been noted that causation is a 
nebulous and difficult concept, especially in circumstances where there 
are multiple events that contribute to a certain outcome. The meaning 
of causation needs to be context sensitive to the area of law in question 
and the evidence which is typically available regarding claims in the 
relevant area. In nearly all refugee cases, the persecutor is not a party 
and does not give evidence, and therefore it is impossible to interrogate 
their motives, intentions and beliefs. 
Additionally, if an applicant is denied refugee status simply 
because they do not satisfy one of the grounds but nevertheless is at 
risk of persecution, this can result in a tragic outcome for the applicant. 
Thus, it follows that the grounds should be interpreted broadly and in a 
manner which recognizes the limits of the evidential material that can 
be tendered in any particular case. It is impossible in most cases for a 
refugee applicant to tender first hand evidence from their persecutor 
regarding the exact reason that they are being targeted. It is thus unfair 
to expect a refugee applicant to demonstrate in a compelling manner 
the exact casual basis for which they are being targeted. 
A more realistic and coherent approach needs to be taken to issues 
of causation. To this end, it is suggested that the appropriate casual 
nexus should be satisfied where the evidence suggests that the 
applicant’s political opinion is one or more of the reasons that they are 
being targeted for persecution; there should not be a requirement that 
it is an operative or the main reason that they are in fear of their safety. 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The world is experiencing refugee flows which are at 
unprecedented levels in recent human history. There are no obvious 
solutions to this crisis and in fact the number of refugees is increasing 
each year. The refugee crisis is being particularly felt by the United 
States due to increasing volatility in the political and social situation in 
its region, especially in Venezuela and other regions in Central 
America. 
The crisis caused by large numbers of asylum seekers has 
generated a mass amount of media and social commentary. No 
systematic approach to dealing with the crisis has been suggested. A 
paradox that has emerged is that the increase in asylum seekers has 
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been met with a reduction in the asylum cap in the United States and 
also an increased determination by the United States Government to 
physically prevent asylum seekers from reaching American soil. This 
has been accomplished by closing American borders in locations which 
are often pathways to the United States. Another paradox to emerge 
regarding the lowering of the asylum cap is that despite the 
significantly increased refugee demand, the cap in recent years has not 
been met. 
It is clear that the United States like many countries around the 
world is experiencing difficulties regarding the best way in which to 
approach the increasing refugee problem. In a large part, the solutions 
to refugee flows are political and social in nature. The approach will 
largely turn on the willingness of countries to absorb large amounts of 
desperate people fleeing their homeland. 
The approach however is not solely political. It also has a legal 
dimension. The fundamental bulwark around which refugee claims 
have been determined for nearly 100 years now in more than 140 
countries including the United States is the Refugee Convention. This 
instrument has provided the pathway for the settlement of millions of 
asylum seekers worldwide. However, the instrument is equivocal in 
relation to the exact profile of people who should be granted refugee 
status. This uncertainty provides a further obstacle to people being able 
to persuasively articulate their case for refugee settlement and can 
diminish their inclination to assert grounds in the Convention as being 
the basis for settling in a new country. 
One of the five refugee grounds is political opinion. This is a 
particularly important contemporary ground given that millions of 
current displaced people have left their country of origin on the basis 
of turmoil and conflict which has a political foundation. The capacity 
of asylum seekers to use this ground as a pathway for settlement in their 
country of refuge has been attenuated by the fact that the courts have 
failed to comprehensively define the meaning of political opinion, and 
to the extent that they have considered the term, it has been examined 
in an ad hoc and narrow fashion. 
Political opinion needs to be defined in a transparent and coherent 
manner so that asylum seekers are in a position to foreshadow whether 
their claims are likely to come within the scope of this concept. As we 
have seen, two particular shortcomings regarding the current approach 
that is often adopted to political opinion are that it is necessary for the 
applicant to have a defined position regarding a political matter and the 
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requirement to establish that this is a key cause of their fear of 
persecution. 
These approaches are flawed. They are inconsistent with the 
purpose of the Refugee Convention and its history. A more coherent 
approach would abolish the requirement that an individual must have 
an established position regarding a political matter. To this end, an 
approach in-line Canada should be adopted. Moreover, given the 
evidential limitations that normally apply in relation to refugee 
applications, there should be no requirement that an asylum seeker 
must establish a strong casual nexus between political opinion and the 
persecution. These changes will make the law in this area clearer and 
more coherent and provide greater certainty and clarity to both asylum 
seekers and decision makers, thereby enhancing the consistency and 
fairness in the processing of refugee claims. 
